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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel decentralised control mech-
anism to manage micro-storage in the smart grid. Our ap-
proach uses an adaptive pricing scheme that energy suppli-
ers apply to home smart agents controlling micro-storage de-
vices. In particular, we prove that the interaction between a
supplier using our pricing scheme and the actions of selﬁsh
micro-storage agents forms a globally stable feedback loop
that converges to an efﬁcient equilibrium. We further propose
a market strategy that allows the supplier to reduce wholesale
purchasing costs without increasing the uncertainty and vari-
ance for its aggregate consumer demand. Moreover, we em-
pirically evaluate our mechanism (based on the UK grid data)
and show that it yields savings of up to 16% in energy cost
for consumers using storage devices with average capacity 10
kWh. Furthermore, we show that it is robust against extreme
system changes.
1 Introduction
The need for sustainable future energy provision has driven
a large research effort into the development of several in-
telligent electricity networktechnologies,collectivelycalled
the smart grid (US Department Of Energy 2003; Galvin
and Yeager 2008; UK Department of Energy and Climate
Change 2009). A major component of this future vision is
that of energy storage. In particular, there is potential seen
in the widespread adoption of small scale consumer stor-
age devices (i.e., micro-storage), which would allow con-
sumers to store electricity when demand is low, in order for
it to be used during peak loads (Bathurst and Strbac 2003;
Ramchurn et al. 2011a; Vytelingum et al. 2010). This
technology has the added advantage that it requires no
signiﬁcant change in how home appliances are used, and
thus allows consumers to respond to pricing signals with
no impact on their own personal comfort. The intention
is to lower peak demand, reducing the need to use ex-
pensive, carbon intensive “peaking plant” generators and,
thus, lowering both carbon emissions and consumer en-
ergy costs. This scenario looks increasingly likely given
the advent of consumer batteries, either stand-alone or for
use in electric vehicles (EVs), able to hold enough energy
to satisfy the needs of a home (den Bossche et al. 2006;
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Gerding et al. 2011). Moreover, the widespread deploy-
ment of EVs is likely to improve economies of scale and
could potentially act as a source of cheaper (less efﬁcient)
used batteries in the long run. The downside to this trend is
that a large number of batteries of various capacities, charge
rates, and efﬁciencies are likely to be used and charged on
the grid, potentially at the same time. This may result in un-
predictableand peaky demand, which could increase carbon
emissions, destabilise the grid, and even cause blackouts.
To avoid these pitfalls, it is crucial that widespread micro-
storage be controlled so as to make aggregate demand more
stable and predictable. Taking a centralised approach, how-
ever, would be impractical as it could involve coordinating
millions of devices, each with its own individual constraints
and consumer preferences. Hence, we turn to the multi-
agent systems paradigm, which is a natural ﬁt for managing
such large systems in a decentralised fashion. Recent work
on applying agents in the smart grid include (Ramchurn et
al. 2011b; Kok and Venekamp 2010) where the intention is
to locally automate energy management tasks in the home
via a smart meter. Smart meters are intended to allow sup-
pliers to access detailed energy consumption data and, more
importantly, provide network information, such as real-time
pricing (RTP) signals, to consumers in an attempt to bet-
ter control or reduce demand when electricity is expensive
or carbon intensive on the grid (Hammerstrom et al. 2008;
Smith 2010). Accordingly, we envisage that micro-storage
will be controlled by autonomous software agents that will
react to RTP signals to minimise their owner’s costs (i.e.,
they are self-interested). In this vein, we note our recent
work (Vytelingum et al. 2010) in which we showed that,
whenactingpurelyselﬁshly, largenumbersofmicro-storage
agents can cause instability in the aggregate demand pro-
ﬁle. This is undesirable, as failing to accurately predict
consumers needs can be very costly for energy suppliers.
Hence, we proposed a stable adaptive learning mechanism
for micro-storage agents. However, we only considered
agents purchasing energy (and not re-selling) and had no
mechanism to ensure participation. In this paper, we take
a complimentary approach, exploiting the role an energy
supplier can play as an intermediary between consumer and
market. The stronger buying power of an energy supplier
allows us to use a more detailed and complex model of the
wholesale market, and the potential complexity of interac-tion between supplier and consumer allows us to consider
suppliers purchasing energy from consumers and providing
explicit incentives for cooperative behaviour. The develop-
mentofrealisticmodelsandefﬁcientmicro-storagemanage-
ment mechanisms for suppliers and consumers is essential if
the technologyis to be widely adopted. This is the challenge
we address in this paper.
In more detail, we use agent-based optimisation and con-
trol theoreticapproachesto designa novelmethodforan en-
ergy supplier to proﬁtably manage widespread home micro-
storage in a decentralised fashion, without having full infor-
mation on the number or capabilities of the storage devices
present. Our approach involves using pricing signals that
are broadcast to consumers in advance of each daily period,
and allowing micro-storage agents to buy and sell electric-
ity at the same price at any given time interval. We argue
this makes agent behaviour more predictable as it removes
the need for agents to speculate on prices or their owners’
load proﬁles. We also introduce a novel method of charg-
ing consumers for changing their storage proﬁle from day
to day. This incentivises micro-storage agents to adapt to
prices slowly, thus improving system stability. Using these
key insights, we make the following novel contributions:
1. We propose a novel general adaptive pricing scheme that
can be used by suppliers to manage aggregate consumer
demand proﬁles in a decentralised fashion. We prove
that the interaction between a supplier using our scheme
and the actions of individual selﬁsh micro-storage agents
forms a stable feedback loop, under which the aggregate
demand proﬁle converges to a unique equilibrium.
2. We provide a speciﬁc example of our pricing scheme,
with pricing functions that are designed to recover sup-
plier costs. In simulated experiments of realistic scenar-
ios, we empirically show that this pricing scheme sta-
bilises the aggregate micro-storage proﬁle, is robust to
shocks (sudden increases or reduction in micro-storage),
and provides sufﬁcient consumer revenue to guarantee a
proﬁt.
3. We propose a market strategy that allows the supplier to
reduce wholesale purchasingcosts without increasing un-
certaintyandvarianceforits aggregateconsumerdemand.
In simulated experiments, this strategy is shown to reduce
suppliers costs over time, while still beneﬁting the con-
sumer. In particular, using data taken from the UK grid,
our approach is show to yield savings of up to 16% in
energy cost for consumers using storage devices with av-
erage capacity 10 kWh. Moreover, we show that our al-
gorithm is robust against extreme system changes. When
taken together our results constitute the ﬁrst key bench-
marks for energy supply management for home micro-
storage in the smart grid.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we discuss our model of the smart grid agents, supplier, and
electricity markets. We then present our novel algorithm in
Section 3. Section 4 presents our theoretical results, and
gives conditions for the stability of our mechanism. Build-
ing on this, in Section 5 we empirically test our algorithm’s
performance using a simulation of the UK electricity mar-
ket. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Agents and Supplier Models
In our model, we consider ﬁxed time intervals consisting of
single days, each separated into T =4 8settlement periods
of half an hour. The time of the start of the day is taken to be
thebeginningofthe off-peakhoursat night, whenelectricity
is cheapest, so consumers will aim to use all stored energy
by time T. We now describe our model of home micro-
storage control agents.
Home Storage Control Agents
We consider a set of consumers A which we deﬁne as self-
ish agents that always minimise their individual costs. Each
agent a ∈Ahas a load proﬁle la
i ∀i ∈I= {1,...,T},
such that la
i is the amount of electricity used by the owner
of agent a during time interval i. The aggregate load pro-
ﬁle of the system is given by li =
 
a∈A la
i . We consider
this aggregate load proﬁle to be ﬁxed. Although there are
seasonal variations in demand in practice, there is a high
degree of consistency from day to day with some variation
between weekday and weekend proﬁles. With that in mind,
an energy supplier could operate a concurrent implementa-
tion of our pricing scheme for each day of the week, with
the daily learning in our algorithm actually occurring be-
tween days that are a week apart. Each agent a ∈Amay
also have some storage available to it, with capacity ea,e f ﬁ -
ciency αa and running costs ca, such that if q amount of en-
ergy is stored, then αaq may be discharged and the storage
cost is caq. Here, the cost ca may represent a ﬁxed capital
investment divided over the charging cycle lifetime of the
storage device.
Inordertominimisecosts, a canattemptto strategiseover
its storage proﬁle. A storage proﬁle is a vector of values
that represent the amount of energy charged and discharged
during individual time intervals. We use b
a+
i ≥ 0,b
a−
i ≥
0 ∀i ∈Ito denote the storage proﬁle of agent a ∈A ,
where, for each i ∈I , b
a+
i and b
a−
i represent the precise
amount of energy charged and discharged during i, respec-
tively. The device cannot charge and discharge at the same
time, and must always have between 0 and ea stored. Thus,
a storage proﬁle is feasible if and only if, for all i ∈I ,
(b
a+
i /ba
+)+( b
a−
i /ba
−) ≤ 1, where ba
+ and ba
− are the max-
imum charge and discharge volumes for one time interval,
and 0 ≤
 i
j=1 αab
a+
j − b
a−
j ≤ αaea, with equality on
the left relation at i = T. We let Ba represent the set of
valid storage proﬁles for a, and set B = ×a∈ABa. Here ×
denotes the Cartesian productof vector spaces. Since the in-
equalities that deﬁne B are linear and not strict, and it must
be closed and convex. For any b ∈B , for all i ∈Iwe let
ba
i = b
a+
i − b
a−
i for each a ∈A , and we let bi =
 
a∈A ba
i.
The Supplier
We consider a single supplier providing energy for its con-
sumers. To this end, as in most electricity markets (e.g., UK
or US), the supplier buys electricity from generators eitherBaseload 23:00 - 23:00 p
o ∼ 47.3
Peak 07:00 - 19:00 p
o ∼ 54.01
Extended peak 07:00 - 23:00 p
o ∼ 51.69
Off peak 23:00 - 07:00 & 19:00 - 23:00 p
o ∼ 40.58
4 Hrs block 6 blocks per day from 23:00 to 23:00 p
o ∈ [22,103]
2 Hrs block 12 blocks per day from 23:00 to 23:00 p
o ∈ [21,139]
Half hour block 48 blocks per days from 00:00 to 24:00 p
o ∈ [17,157]
Table 1: Forward market contracts span a speciﬁc period of time
and charge different prices. The range of prices shown were ob-
tained from APX-ENDEXfor January 2010. As can be seen, prices
are generally higher for shorter time periods.
directly or through wholesale electricity markets. We fo-
cus on the two fundamental types of markets which are the
day-ahead forward market1 (where prices are known on a
day-ahead basis and where most of the trades occur) and the
balancing market2 (where prices are known a posteriori).
The forward market runs on a day-ahead basis whereby
the supplier can purchase amounts of energy f o
i ∈ R+ from
different types of electricity contracts, Θ={o1,···,o |Θ|}
deﬁnedoverthe next24hours (see Table 2)and validonly at
certain times during the day. The supplier purchases a quan-
tity fi =
 
o∈Θ fo
i ∀i ∈Iat price C
f
i =
 
o∈Θ fo
i po ∀i ∈
I. We also deﬁne F as the set of all feasible contract pur-
chases, fo
i ∀i ∈I ,∀o ∈ Θ (i.e., amounts that the supplier
is able to purchase) and pi
f = C
f
i /fi as the average contract
price. The balancing market then settles any differences in
committed supply and actual supply in real-time (these dif-
ferences occur when consumers or generators behave unex-
pectedly due to weather effects, outages, or other factors).
Thus, any excess purchased,(fi−di)+ (where di = li+bi),
is sold at the balancing sell price psell and excess electricity
used, (di − fi)+, is purchased at the balancing buy price
pbuy. Notethat thebalancingbuyandsell pricesaretypically
higher and lower respectively compared to forward market
prices and hence, it is crucial that the supplier ensures that
it can cater for most of its customers demand from forward
market contracts rather than leaving it to the balancing mar-
ket. We next elaborate on our proposed supplier strategy,
in particular how to set prices for customers in order to sta-
bilise storage (and, as a result, stabilise aggregate demand),
and minimise its costs on the electricity market.
3 Supplier Strategy
The supplier has complex objectives. On the one hand, it
needs to manage the behaviour of its customers using only
pricing signals, without fully knowing their storage capabil-
ities. On the other hand, it needs to get the best price it can
on the electricity market given the high penalties in the bal-
1We use real UK market data from APX-ENDEX energy ex-
change (http://www.apxendex.com) for the period from
January to March 2010. Note that our model can be extended to
consider contracts over longer terms, such as weeks, seasons or
years. However, this is beyond the scope of this work.
2We use real data obtained from the UK balancing market
(http://www.bmreports.com).
ancing market associated with under or over supply. In this
section, we propose a novel mechanism for a supplier to sta-
bilise demand while maximising its revenue by optimising
its purchases in the forward market. Crucially, in Section 4,
we go on to prove that our mechanism is converges to a sta-
ble equilibrium.
Pricing Mechanism
We consider the situation where the electricity supplier sets
a price for energy pi for each i ∈I . When micro-storage
agents react to such pricing signals, the aggregate behaviour
can be unstable, as their charging and discharging activi-
ties tend to concentrate in those time intervals with extremal
prices. This results in agents adopting “all or nothing” be-
haviour, where they either charge or discharge at maximum
rate or do nothing at all. In order to combat this volatility,
we propose the following. First, the supplier passes the real-
time prices at the beginningof the day (instead of communi-
catingthemeveryhalf-hourasin(Hammerstrometal. 2008)
or at the end of the day as in (Vytelingum et al. 2010)).
This allows agents to explicitly optimise their storage pro-
ﬁles without needing to speculate on future price changes.
Second, under our mechanism, agents are allowed to both
buy and sell electricity at the same price pi for each i ∈I .
Thus, discharging a quantity of stored electricity generates
the same proﬁt to the consumer when sold to the supplier as
when used by the consumer, and so the optimal storage pro-
ﬁle is completely independent of load at time i. This avoids
agentshavingto speculate againsttheir uncertainfutureload
proﬁle, which can vary greatly from day to day and would
be hard for agents to reliably predict. Hence, if all agents
storeoptimallyaccordingto pricesgiven,theiraggregatebe-
haviourbecomes more predictable. Third, as the central part
of our control mechanism, we propose that, in order to sta-
bilise the system, agents be charged an additional fee based
on how greatly they change their storage proﬁle. That is,
each agent a ∈Apays a daily fee of
 
i∈I κ
 
ba
i − ˜ ba
i
 2
,
where ˜ ba is the previous days storage proﬁle and κ>0 is a
parameter given by the supplier. As we show in Theorem 1,
ifκ is largeenough,this introducesenoughdampinginto the
system to guarantee stability.
Since the behaviour of the agent will be to maximise the
proﬁt of its user, we can now predict that each a ∈Awill
adopt the following optimal storage proﬁle,
ba =a r g m i n
ba∈Ba
 
i∈I
piba
i + cab
a+
i + κ
 
ba
i −˜ ba
i
 2
(1)
This characterisation of agent behaviour is sufﬁcient for us
to model the control loop between supplier and consumer
agentsandcomeupwithapricingstrategythatallowsaggre-
gate micro-storage management without requiring the sup-
plier to know fully the number or parameters of the storage
devices belonging to its consumers.
From day to day, we propose that the electricity supplier
updates its prices according to the current loads, follow-
ing some strictly increasing, differentiable pricing function
pi(·), with |p 
i(·)| <Kfor some K. At the end of each day
the new price proﬁle for the next pnew is set as pi(·) of theprevious days total demand:
p
new
i = pi(li + bi). (2)
As we will see later in Section 4, Theorem 1 shows that if
κ>K |A|/3, then (1) and (2) form a stable system. This
means the supplier only needs to know an upper bound on
the number of storage devices in operation in order to safely
apply this mechanism.
If the supplier has particular targets for the equilibrium
storage proﬁle (e.g., it has information about its customers’
storage capacity that would allow it to perform arbitrage in
the market or reduce its carbon emissions), it can adjust its
price functions to directly steer the consumers. For exam-
ple, by making the price functions steeper, the supplier can
encourage storage use, and by making them less steep, the
supplier can motivate consumers to use storage less. Oth-
erwise, the supplier can choose price function to reﬂect its
market costs.
In our experiments (see Section 5) we sought to use pric-
ing functions that reduce forward market costs, and ensure
sufﬁcient customer revenue to make a proﬁt. We chose the
followingpricefunctions(whichsatisfy thecriterionthatthe
price function is strictly increasing and differentiable), for
each i ∈I ,
pi(x)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
p
f
i
fi
x +( p
buy
i +2 Δ pf)
x−fi
x ,x>f i
p
f
i −
Δp
f
x (fi − x) ,f i/2 ≤ x ≤ fi
psell
i ,x<f i/2
(3)
where we set Δpf to be the maximum of p
f
i − psell
i . In this
case a suitable value for K would be:
K =m a x
i∈I
max
 4Δpf
fi
,
1
fi
(p
f
i + p
buy
i +2 Δ pf)
 
.
With these choices, Proposition 1, in Section 4, shows that
under (1) – (3), when storage proﬁles converge, the supplier
is guaranteed a proﬁt. We achieve this in part by ensuring
that for each i ∈I , it sets pi(fi)=p
f
i , where p
f
i is the
average forward contract price for time interval i. This has
the addedbeneﬁtthat since the pi(·) functionsare strictly in-
creasing, if the agents react to the price signals by changing
their storage allocation, they will do so in a way that would
be proﬁtable to the supplier if they were charged according
to p
f
i . Hence, if the aggregate demand deviates from fi,
the supplier can and will reduce costs by re-optimising their
forward contracts (as we show later in Section 5). We next
discuss how the supplier can optimise its contracts given re-
alistic uncertainty in its customers’ demand.
Market Strategy
Since the aggregate load proﬁle gradually changes as per
our mechanism (as we show later, it eventually reaches an
equilibrium), we can expect that it will deviate from the for-
ward contract amounts on a daily basis and the supplier may
have to trade on the balancingmarket to cater for under/over
usage. Since the balancing market is more expensive than
the forward market, the supplier can reduce costs by re-
optimising its forward contracts daily. Note, if using the
pricing functions (3), these must be re-computed every time
the forward market contracts are changed. In what follows,
we present an optimisation model that allows a supplier to
optimise its contracts against uncertain demand.
To decide on the contracts to acquire, the supplier simply
computes the optimal quantity for each contract3 fo
i ,∀o ∈
Θ,∀i ∈Ithat minimises its costs. However, because the
consumers’ aggregate demand di as well as balancing buy
and sell prices are not known a priori, the supplier needs to
computethe amountsfor each contractthat will minimise its
expected costs subject to uncertainties in prices and demand
(see Figures 1 and 2 respectively).
We address this problem by modelling the aggregate load
andpricesusingastandardARMA(auto-regressivemoving-
average) statistical model4 that can deal with the seasonal
trendsof loadsandprices(Weron2006). Inso doing,we can
build a distribution of the following day’s balancing prices
and the aggregate load. The supplier’s problem is now to
minimise its cost based on distributions of the demand and
buy and sell prices. To deal with the optimisation under un-
certainty, we use Monte Carlo simulations, drawing a large
number of samples S from the distributions and expanding
the objective function to factor in the samples as follows:
argmin
f∈F
 
s∈S
 
i∈I
 
C
f
i + p
buy
i,s(di,s − fi)+ + psell
i,s(di,s − fi)−
 
(4)
where fi =
 
o∈Θ fo
i for amounts f o
i selected. The above
optimisation returns a proﬁle of optimal quantity ˆ fo
i to pur-
chase from each contract at time i which are, in turn, used to
formulate our pricing functions as in the previous section. It
isimportanttonotethatthismethoddoesnotrelyondetailed
informationabout the consumer storage devices present, but
instead adapts to changes in the aggregate demand proﬁle
in order to reduce costs. We next present the key analytical
properties of our proposed mechanism.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section we give the theoretical results which support
our proposed algorithm. We begin by showing that (1) –
(2) is stable. Our proof uses a novel application of a Lya-
punovfunction (Slotine and Weiping 1991), where the func-
tion is chosen so that it is always less than or equal to total
agent costs with equality if agents do not change their stor-
age proﬁle. As agents attempt to reduce costs, they cause
the Lyapunov function to decrease monotonically, and the
system converges to its minimising aggregate proﬁle. This
3The supplier can purchase any set of contracts to cover any
quantity. For example, a baseload contract will have a lower price
(asitcan be provided by cheap nuclear generation) than the average
daily balancing buy prices. Generally, contract prices tend to be
marginally lower that the average balancing prices over the same
period. However, forward contracts reduce market risk as forward
prices are known a priori and are thus desirable.
4We chose a standard model, as forecasting of load and prices
is beyond the scope of this paper, and not central to the supplier’s
adaptive mechanism (Weron 2006). More complex quantitative
models (e.g., GARCH or Jump-Diffusion models) can be used for
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Figure 1: Distribution of balancing buy prices in the UK (October
2009 to March 2010).
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Figure 2: Load distribution (with seasonal trend removed) in the
UK (January to March 2010).
method of proof allows the supplier to manage agent re-
sponses without having any information about the capabil-
ities of the micro-storage devices they control. All that is
required is an upper bound on the number of active micro-
storage devices in the system.
Theorem 1. Given a ﬁxed set of forward contracts, the sys-
tem (1) – (2) is stable, in that the vector b converges to an
equilibrium, provided:
κ ≥
KN
3
,
where N is the number of agents with active storage de-
vices and K is an upper bound on |p 
i(·)| for all i ∈Iover
the relevant range of demand quantities. In this case, the
aggregate storage proﬁle at equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Let us deﬁne the Lyapunov function V (·) to be,
V (b)=
 
i∈I
  li+bi
fi
pi(li + bi)+
 
a∈A
cab
a+
i .
Since the pi(·) are increasing,V (·) is convex,with a convex
regionof optimality over B, and no other local minima. Fur-
thermore, as the pi(·) are strictly increasing, the aggregate
storage proﬁle must be the same for all optimal proﬁles. For
any two storage proﬁles b,b , let us also deﬁne Vb(·),
Vb(b)=
 
i∈I
pi(li + b
 
i)(li + bi)+
 
a∈A
c
ab
a+
i .
Now let us consider a particular day. Suppose the pre-
vious days storage proﬁle is given by b ∈Band the new
storage proﬁle is b +Δ b. From (1) – (2) we can deduce that
Δb is chosen so that b +Δ b minimises Wb(b +Δ b) over B
where we deﬁne Wb(·) to be:
Wb(b+Δb)=Vb(b+Δb)+κ
 
i∈I
 
a∈A
 
Δb
a+
i +−Δb
a−
i
 2
.
Now, if we use ∇ to denote gradient, then, by deﬁnition,
∇Vb(b)=∇V (b), and so, ∇Wb(b)=∇V (b).S oWb(b +
Δb)−Wb(b) ≤ 0, with equality only if ∇V (b)·(b −b) ≥ 0
for all feasible b  ∈B .
We calculate that:
V (b +Δ b) − V (b)=
  1
0
tΔb ·∇ V (b + tΔb)dt,
and
Vb(b +Δ b) − Vb(b)=
  1
0
tΔb ·∇ V (b)dt.
The difference between these two is:
  1
0
tΔb · (∇V (b) −∇ V (b + tΔb))dt.
However, since the price functions pi(·) for i ∈Iare the
only non-linear component of V (·), we have that the rate of
changeofeach coordinateof ∇V (·) is boundedbyK. Thus,
V (b +Δ b) − V (b) is less than or equal to:
Vb(b +Δ b) − Vb(b)+
  1
0
t2K
 
i∈I
(Δbi)2dt,
= Vb(b +Δ b) − Vb(b)+
K
3
 
i∈I
(Δbi)
2,
≤ Vb(b +Δ b) − Vb(b)+
KN
3
 
i∈I
 
a∈A
 
Δb
a+
i − Δb
a−
i
 2
≤ Wb(b +Δ b) − Wb(b) ≤ 0,
by choice of κ. Thus, for each day after the forward mar-
ket strategy is computed, V (b) is non-increasing. Since it
has a global minimum, the size of these decreases must tend
to zero. However, from the above, this can only happen if
∇V (b)·(b −b) tends to a valuegreaterthan or equal to 0 for
all b  ∈B . By the continuity of ∇V (b), we must have that b
converges to the optimal region for V (b) within B.
Note, althoughN will be potentiallyverylarge, K should
be very small, and should be roughly O(1/|A|), since K
depends on how much prices vary when a single user varies
theirstorageproﬁle. Inourexperimentsweuseκ = |A|K/3
and calculate K as given in Section 3.
We can also show that the prices we give in (3) are suited
to recovering the costs of the energy supplier.
Proposition 1. Provided the total daily electricity bought
in the forward market is at most the total daily load then
if b is sufﬁciently close to the previous days storage proﬁle,
then the supplier recovers their costs from consumers. More
precisely,
 
i∈I
pi(li + bi)(li + bi) ≥ Ci(li + bi).Proof. For all i ∈Ilet di = li + bi.I fdi <f i then, from
(3),
pi(di)di ≥ C
f
i − (fi − di)(p
f
i +Δ pf),
and if di ≥ fi,
pi(di)di ≥ C
f
i +( di − fi)(pbuy +2 Δ pf).
Thus, if the total market costs are
C
f
i + p
buy
i (di − fi)+ + psell
i (di − fi)−,
then the total revenue minus total costs is at least:
2d+Δpf − d−Δpf −
 
i∈I
(fi − di)+(p
f
i − psell
i ),
where d+ is the sum of (di − fi)+ and d− is the sum of
(fi −di)+. However, since the total sum of fi is at most the
total sum of li, and all storage devices have efﬁciency less
than or equal to 1, the amount discharged to cause a surplus
must be less than the amount charged. Therefore, we must
have d+ ≤ d−, and so the total revenue is at least as big as
the total costs to the supplier.
This means that, once (1) – (3) has converged, the energy
supplier is guaranteed to make a proﬁt each day.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our decen-
tralised control mechanism. Speciﬁcally, we set up a simu-
lation based on 1000 consumers, each with a different bat-
tery,5 usingrealloaddatafromJanuarytoMarch2010(from
a set ofanonymisedUK consumers– see Figure2), over100
runs.6 We used real market data over the same period with
an additional historical data of 3 months of the balancing
market prices (October 2009 to March 2010 – see Figure 1)
to calibrate our model of price distribution.
As discussed in Section 1, an important objective of the
pricing mechanism is to ensure stable aggregate consumer
behaviours. To this end, we analyse the stability of the sys-
tem over a number of days to ascertain the effectiveness of
the mechanism. From Figure 3, we can observe that the
root mean squared of the difference between the forward-
contracted demand and the aggregate consumer demand de-
creases from 31.5 (when there is no storage) and converges
to an equilibrium around 14.1. As it does so, the expected
wholesale cost of the system also converges to an equilib-
rium. Figure 3 also shows how the expected wholesale cost
gradually decreases (by 16% from 33.47p to 28.22p) and
converges after a number of trading days. The consumer
cost (ignoring the supplier’s proﬁt and operational margin)
decreases by 9.28p (from 42.42p to 33.14p). Note that a
supplier typically inﬂates the retail price to include a proﬁt
and an operational margin which the consumers pays on top
5For each battery, its capacity is deﬁned by a normal distribu-
tion N(10,3), its efﬁciency by min(1.0,N(0.8,0.2)), its charg-
ing capacity by N(0.8,0.4) and, ﬁnally, its discharging capacity
by N(0.8,0.4). These values were based on typical batteries.
6Using a t-test,we validated our results withα =0 .05 toensure
that they were signiﬁcant.
of the consumers’ cost (or retail revenue) we describe here.
Thus,giventhe16%decreaseinits wholesalecostandbased
on its margin, the supplier can markup on the, now reduced,
consumer’s cost or can simply reduce the retail price to in-
centivise storage. Furthermore, we observe from Figure 4
that the volatility (measured as the normalised standard de-
viation of prices) of the expected wholesale cost is notice-
ably lower (decreasing from 6.6% to 5.3%). Lower volatil-
ity is be desirable for the supplier, especially with the high
volatility of prices in electricity markets.
28
30
32
34
36
38
Trading days
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
c
o
s
t
 
(
p
)
20 40 60 80 100 120
10
15
20
25
30
35
R
M
S
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
Wholesale cost
Consumer cost
42
RMS difference
Convergence
RMS difference = 31.5
Wholesale cost =28.2
RMS difference =14.1
Consumer cost = 33.1
Figure 3: Expected daily wholesale cost of electricity per
consumer (starting at 33.19p with no storage) and consumer
cost (without supplier’s proﬁt and operational margin).
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Finally, we analyse the stability of our mechanism when
faced with system shocks (i.e., a sudden and drastic change
in micro-storage demand response capability). Speciﬁcally,
we simulate 50% of the batteries failing (e.g., as a result
of a glitch in batteries or network outage) on Day 100 and
all repaired and reinstated on Day 200. Figure 5 shows the
effect of such shocks on the system by looking at how the
root mean squared difference between total daily demand
and forward-contracted demand changes. In particular, we
observe that from Day 100, there is a considerable differ-
ence between the contracted demand and the actual demand
(as a result of the micro-storage failure). However, the sys-
tem quickly re-adapts, converging to a new equilibrium. On
the other hand, when all the failed batteries are repaired on
Day 200, the agents with newly repaired batteries gradu-
ally build up their storage proﬁle due to dampening by our
pricing mechanism, while the supplier re-optimises its for-
ward contracts subject to the increasing demand. The rate
of increase of the storage is sufﬁciently low that the supplier
can optimise its forward contracts and ensure the difference0 50 100 150 200 250 300
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Figure 5: Root mean squared difference between contracted
and actual demand, with a shock on Day 100 when 50% of
the batteries fail and on Day 200 when they are repaired.
between the contracted demand and actual demand remains
small. The effective response of our mechanism to extreme
changes implies that our mechanismis indeed robust against
system changes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel algorithm for the decen-
tralised control of widespread micro-storage in the smart
grid. We proved theoretical results that showed the stability
and proﬁtability of the algorithm and then conducted exper-
imental simulations to verify those results. We empirically
showed that, in a realistic scenario our mechanism reduced
consumer costs by 16%, and further, we showed that it is
stable against dramatic short term changes in the system.
We see this as an important step to showing that the adop-
tion of widespread, supplier managed home energy micro-
storage is a practical, desirable technology to develop. Us-
ing the techniques described in this paper, we can envisage
energy suppliers utilising large numbers of affordable small
scale storage devices in order to manage aggregateload pro-
ﬁles, improve efﬁciency and reduce carbon output. Future
work should involve integrating these models and simula-
tionsintofurtherimportantelementsofthefuturesmartgrid.
This couldincludemodellingtheinteractionbetweenmicro-
storage and intermittent or unreliable renewable generation,
and analysing the impact of vehicle to grid schemes on ag-
gregate load proﬁles.
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